Stopping the SuperSpreader Epidemic: the lessons from SARS (with,
  perhaps, applications to MERS) by Wick, W. David
Stopping the SuperSpreader
Epidemic:
the lessons from SARS (with,
perhaps, applications to MERS)
W. David Wick1∗
October 18, 2018
∗Email:wdavid.wick@gmail.com
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
65
34
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
29
 A
ug
 20
13
Stopping the SS epidemic 2
Abstract
I discuss the so-called SuperSpreader (SS) epidemic, for which SARS is the
canonical example (and, perhaps, MERS will be another). I use simulation by
an agent-based model as well as the mathematics of multi-type branching-
processes to illustrate how the SS epidemic differs from the more-familiar
uniform epidemic (e.g., caused by influenza). The conclusions may surprise
the reader: (a) the SS epidemic must be described by at least two numbers,
such as the mean reproductive number (of “secondary” infections caused by
a “primary” case), R0, and the variance of same, call it V0; (b) Even with
R0 > 1, if V0  R0 the probability that the infection-chain caused by one
primary case goes extinct without intervention may be close to one (e.g.,
0.97); (c) The SS epidemic may have a long “kindling period” in which spo-
radic cases appear (transmitted from some unknown host) and generate a
cluster of cases, but the chains peter out, perhaps generating a false sense
of security that a pandemic will not occur; (d) Interventions such as isolat-
ing primary cases (or contact-tracing and secondary-case isolation) can be
efficacious even without driving R0 below one; (e) The efficacy of such inter-
ventions diminishes, but slowly, with increasing V0 at fixed R0. From these
considerations, I argue that the SS epidemic has dynamics sufficiently dis-
tinct from the uniform case that efficacious public-health interventions can
be designed even in the absence of a vaccine or other form of treatment.
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Text
This is a mathematical-modeling paper about certain types of epidemics
and corresponding public-health interventions, other than by vaccines or
drugs. My desire is to communicate the main points to a wider audience
then just my fellow math-modelers: in particular, infectious-disease doctors
and public-health officials, who are charged with responding to, and, if pos-
sible, halting, a future epidemic of a deadly disease. So I have chosen to
relegate the mathematical and computational details to appendices (which
are meant to be accessible to anyone with some background in math mod-
eling or computer science, with no prerequisites.) I also eschew the usual
Introduction/Methods/Results/Discussion format and adopt the form of an
essay, because I believe the flow of the argument will be easier for the general
reader to follow.
To begin, recall SARS, the acronym for “Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome,” an atypical form of pneumonia caused by a coronavirus that gen-
erated a gobal pandemic in 2003. The large-scale spread of SARS began
on February 21 of that year, when a professor of medicine in Guangdong
Province, China, who had been treating patients with pneumonia, traveled
to Hong Kong and checked into the Metropole Hotel downtown. For reasons
still unclear, the Professor passed the virus on to about a dozen persons stay-
ing at the hotel.1 Then the Professor, feeling unwell, checked himself into
the teaching hospital and told the staff that he had a dangerous infectious
disease and should be isolated, which the staff accomplished. (The Professor
died of the disease in hospital.) When another patient from the hotel cluster
arrived at the hospital, the staff made a medical mistake (administering an
expectorant or performing aspiration), and subsequently every doctor, nurse,
medical student, and orderly who entered the room—50 or more—developed
SARS. This was the first “superspreader” (SS) event of the epidemic. More
such events followed: 15+ infected on a plane to Beijing, 37 at a hospital in
Vietnam, and so forth. But the godzilla of all known SS events occurred at
an apartment complex in Hong Kong called the Amoy Gardens, where a sick
person visited for one night and generated 300+ secondary cases.2
1There is a theory that he vomited on the rug outside his room, then tried unsuccessfully
to clean it up—based on recovery of viral antigens from the rug, but not the room.
2The individual apparently had diarrhea; the SARS virus, or perhaps a substrain, had
a gut-tropism as well as lung-tropism. Epidemiologists later explained the extraordinary
transmission at the complex as the result of a design error in the plumbing system. The
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Virologists eventually traced the source of SARS to bats, with an interme-
diate host, the civet cat, which was sold in live-animal markets in Guangdong
Province. The final toll (November 2002 to July 11, 2003, the date of the
last known case) was: 29 countries, including Canada and the United States,
affected; 8098 cases; and 774 deaths. (Thus the case mortality for SARS was
around 10 percent; compare to the two percent estimated for the 1918 flu.)
The pandemic is thought to have been brought under control by introduction
of better hospital procedures for rapidly isolating cases; most clusters were
“nosocomial” (occurring in, and specific to, a medical setting) with few sec-
ondary clusters, beyond those mentioned above, occurring in the community.
As I write, a new disease caused by a different coronovirus, called the
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) virus, has appeared and gener-
ated cases in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, and other countries of the Ara-
bian Penninsula (at this time, all cases outside the region have occurred in
persons who had recently visited the Middle East). A steady drumbeat of
sporadic cases (91 since September 2012, as of 25 July 2013), some generat-
ing small SS events (mostly nosocomial), have been reported to the World
Health Agency (and can be followed on the listservice of the International
Society for Infectious Diseases called ProMed-mail). The current estimate of
MERS case mortality is a frightening 50 percent (but “case mortality” has a
denominator problem: the “cases” are hospitalized patients, and we do not
as yet know how many milder cases are occurring in the community). SARS,
MERS, and (in one theory) HIV3 all represent a different kind of epidemic
than usually treated in textbooks (particularly those that emphasize model-
ing). I will refer to a “SuperSpreader epidemic,” SSe for shorthand. Much
of the conventional wisdom about epidemics does not apply to the SSe case.
Next, I informally describe models for an SSe, leaving details about soft-
ware implementation and mathematical issues to appendices. The appro-
bathrooms had floor drains that were supposed to be isolated by U-traps, but these only
function if filled with water; but no one had told the residents to regularly dump a gallon
of water on their bathroom floors.
3Studies of transmission of HIV between an infected and an uninfected partner in a
long-term relationship found very low transmission rates; e.g., one transmission in 1,000
unprotected sex acts. This gave rise to the theory that HIV is an SS epidemic; the
candidates for the superpreaders are: (a) persons in the primary retroviral-infection period
that lasts a few weeks, who have a thousand times the level of virus in blood and semen
found in chronically-infected patients; and (b) cases like “patient zero,” the Canadian
airline attendant with an impressive Rolodex of sexual partners in many cities, described
in ‘Randy Shilts’s 1987 book, And the Band Played On.
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priate kind of model is called a “stochastic multi-type branching-process.”
The adjective “stochastic” refers to random events, as in a dice game; in
computer terms, when simulating the model the program makes calls on
the random number generator, abbreviated RNG (supplied with your op-
erating system), when making updates. The “branching-process” was in-
troduced by mathematicians in the 1920s to describe, among other things,
epidemics. (Other applications include demographic population growth and
nuclear chain-reactions.) In a branching-process, some entity produces a
(random) number of “offspring” at some rate, not depending on the number
of other entities existing, for some (also possibly random) reproductive pe-
riod; the offspring, which may be of various types, can generate descendants
in a similar manner. (The particular sort of branching-processes I use may
differ from the kind described in math texts, however; see the appendices for
the details.) Mathematical biologists also introduced a deterministic model
of epidemics dubbed “SIR,” for susceptible-infected-recovered, appropriate
to describe a measles or influenza epidemic. Here I am interested in inter-
ventions that bring the disease to a halt before it establishes an epidemic,
so the susceptible population can be regarded as fixed. (By the time a mod-
erate fraction of the population of a major city or country had SARS or
MERS, the pandemic would long since have been declared by WHO and,
given the modern phenomenon of “jet spread,” airport closures and interna-
tional panic would soon follow.) In addition, as the reader will understand
from the results described below, a deterministic model of an SSe is totally
inappropriate.4 This is true for much of biology, despite the widespread use
of deterministic equations, called by the ancient acronym “ODEs” whose
significance nobody recalls, by mathematical biologists; see my book, [5].
Now we come to the famous “R0,” also called the basic, or mean, reproduc-
4Full disclosure: In March of 2003, the author and two colleagues sent a paper to Science
proposing a stochastic branching-process model of the SARS epidemic, concluding that
the epidemic could be controlled by rapid isolation of infected patients if R0 was not too
large. Science rejected the paper, with the sole reviewer’s comment being: “The model
looks right, the conclusion looks right, but it doesn’t penetrate!” In fact, the outcome
of the epidemic was as we predicted. Later that Spring, Science published papers from
two modeling groups; one used ODEs, [3], which is absurd, and another, [4], a model like
the authors’, with similar conclusions. The latter group had access to case incidence data
from Hong Kong, which our group lacked (we derived our model from published accounts,
mostly in newspapers and on WHO and CDC websites). Later, the present author fit a
stochastic model to the Hong Kong data, see [5], Chapter 6, in order to derive disease
transmission parameters and demonstrate a new fitting technique.
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tive number of the virus, which was historically the original “tipping-point.”
It is defined as the average number of secondary cases caused (infected di-
rectly by) a primary case, in the absence of any treatment or intervention.
As we will see, that number of secondary infections should be thought of as a
random variable, so it has a variance as well as a mean; to uphold tradition,
I denote it by V0. Now we must carefully distinguish two epidemic scenar-
ios, which I will call the “uniform” (or Poisson) and the SuperSpreader (SS)
epidemics. In the former, the number of secondary cases of a primary case
(assumed for this discussion to have a fixed infectious period) is a Poisson
random variable, which is the name given in probability theory for the num-
ber of events in a random but constant-rate accrual process, like the number
of hits inside the ring by a darts-player of little skill. The Poisson random
variable is characterized by V0 = R0 and a (super-exponential) fall off be-
yond the mean; e.g., if R0 = 2, the probability of the primary case producing
10 secondary infections is infinitesimal. Models in which such accruals have
larger variances are said to possess “extra-Poisson variation” (EPV). What
could be the meaning of this EPV? The more-infectious case—I will also re-
fer to this person as a superspreader—might have a special biological ability
to spread the infection (perhaps through vomiting, diarrhea, or just a deep
cough), or might be situated in some place that facilitates transmission (e.g.,
in a crowded ICU, but not in isolation; on a plane; or visiting the Amoy
Gardens).
The simplest example, that I use throughout this paper for illustrations, is
an epidemic model with two types of infected persons, each making a Poisson-
distributed number of secondary cases. The person of type one has an average
number of secondary cases of Rl (the subscript meaning lower-value), and the
type-two person, Rh (high-level); these occur with probabilities pl and ph, so
the population average is:
R0 = plRl + phRh. (1)
For instance, suppose Rl = 0.7 and Rh = 30.0, with pl = 0.9556 and
ph = 0.04437; then R0 = 2.0, while (easy computation) V0 = 38.4.
Mathematicians proved in the 1920s that a branching-process with R0 >
1 can grow, while one with R0 ≤ 1 eventually dies out. But it is often
overlooked that a branching-process with R0 > 1 can nevertheless go extinct.
The outcome of a branching-process with R0 > 1 (mathematicians use the
phrase, “supercritical”) is dichotomous: either heading for infinity or destined
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to die out, with certain probabilities. For instance, the process with the R’s
above plus assumptions about incubation periods, infectious periods, etc.,
resulting in various models; (see the appendices) will disappear eventually
with probability pe in the range 0.88–0.91. For the uniform case, Rl = Rh =
2.0, pe is about 0.2. As a rule, pe increases with increasing V0 for fixed
R0. This is easy to understand: the most probable “index” (epidemiology
jargon for initial) case is a low-infectivity patient, and, although one or more
secondary cases might follow while the patient remains infectious (even if
Rl < 1), the infection-chain is likely to die out unless preserved by the
appearance of a superspreader.
See Table 1 for some illustrative examples. The simulation technique I
used is described in appendix one, and the parameters are listed there in
Table A. I also included results in the table from an exactly-solvable model,
meaning explicit formulas exist for extinction probabilities (see appendix
two), called the Markov case. I included it to satisfy mathematicians and to
check the software, by comparing probabilities from repeated simulations to
exact answers; but it has a feature that renders it dubious for use in biology.
The Markov case is the model in which all waiting times—times to end of
the incubation period; to end of the infectious period; and to generate the
next secondary case—have exponential distributions (see appendix two for
the explanation of why the famous “Markov property” requires exponential
distributions for all waiting times). But only for the last mentioned is this
a realistic choice: the exponential law was derived from physics, where it
represents radioactive decay; but people are not atoms. For applications I
assumed, pending more data, normal distributions for the incubation and in-
fectious periods (conditional on non-negativity, of course). For these models,
simulation must be used to compute probabilities (for reasons spelled out in
appendix two). So the last column in the Table represents the biologically
more-realistic case. The reason that the entries in this column are the small-
est in the rows is that the Markov case has more EPV; see appendix two.
Table 1. Extinction probabilities for some models and methods∗
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R0 Rh pe (Markov;formula) pe (Markov;sim) pe (normal;sim)
2.0 7.0 0.751 0.754 0.624
10.0 0.803 0.806 0.719
15.0 0.851 0.857 0.788
30.0 0.913 0.912 0.882
1.2 7.0 0.936 0.933 0.889
1.2 30.0 0.980 0.970 0.967
∗ Rl = 0.7; normal standard deviations = 0.2 times means; 10,000 repetitions
in simulations
Next consider MERS, for which (as I write) another sporadic case appar-
ently shows up on average every three days. (A “case” means laboratory-
confirmed in hospital, which may represent the very sick and potential su-
perspreaders; there are probably more cases appearing in the community.)
Let “Sp-int” stand for the average interval between appearances of sporadic
infections. Sp-int is hard to estimate, because it is difficult to distinguish
sporadic from secondary cases; e.g., if in a family a father and two chil-
dren become infected and the father becomes ill first, should the children be
counted as secondary cases, or were they exposed to the same external source
of virus and so additional sporadic cases? Thus Sp-int might be considerably
larger than three days. The law for first-time-to-a-Bernoulli-event gives:
average time of initiation of the pandemic =
Sp-int
1− pe , (2)
E.g., if pe = 0.98 and Sp-int is 3 days, the mean initiation time is 150 days
(but it could be much longer).
Because of the dichotomy and the tendency of most infection-chains to
go extinct, the SSe with large EPV seeded by sporadic cases can be very
surprising. For instance, Figure 1 shows an epidemic with R’s as in the
example above; for several months the epidemic seems indolent, then around
70 days, it takes off. Figure 2 shows another epidemic with parameters from
the last row (most extreme case) of the Table; nothing exciting happens for a
year, which might cause premature optimism among public-health officials;
then comes disaster. (Rerunning with the same parameters but different
“seeds” for the RNG, the timing of the pandemic in the figures is highly
variable.) Note that no spontaneous modifications, genetic or otherwise, are
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assumed in the virus for these simulations; disease parameters are fixed. The
patterns are entirely due to EPV and chance.
Now to interventions. Neither vaccines nor therapeutic drugs currently ex-
ist for human coronaviruses; considering that the SARS virus has disappeared
while MERS remains contained, and the enormous cost of developing, test-
ing, and licensing a new vaccine or drug, this unfortunate situation is likely
to persist. Therefore, let us explore other interventions that could prevent
an SSe pandemic by these viruses. The interventions are restricted to isola-
tion of cases, preventing some secondary infections. The intervention might
be primary: rapidly isolating an infected patient in hospital in a negative-
pressure room and requiring all attendant personel to wear gowns and P99
masks, hopefully decreasing the patient’s infectious period; or secondary:
tracing contacts of the primary case and getting as many as possible to go
into isolation at home, thus diminishing secondary infections. The secondary
intervention has one advantage over the primary: it can be instigated even if
laboratory tests are delayed beyond the lifetime, or infectious period, of the
patient, which may be a consideration early in the epidemic. Both interven-
tions have the same effect: decreasing the effective “R” of the patient. An
interesting special case, which I will refer to as the “SS intervention” (SSi),
limits the intervention to high-infectivity cases. Possible scenarios where the
SSi is effective might include: SS patients are sicker and usually hospitalized,
while low-infectivity cases remain in the community; and where SS patients
can be detected by some physiological or virological measurement.
In most discussions of interventions in infectious-disease epidemiology, it
is assumed that an efficacious intervention is one that drives R0 below one.
I argue that, for the SSe, the proper quantity to look at is not R0 but the
extinction probability of the infection-chain, which I have denoted by pe.
Thus the goal of the intervention must be to increase pe; indeed, I define
intervention-efficacy (IE) by:
IE =
pe,i − pe
1− pe . (3)
where pe,i stands for the extinction probability in the presence of the inter-
vention. Thus IE = 1.0 if the intervention drives pe,i all the way to one, and
zero if pe,i = pe. Of course, if the intervention should push R0 below one,
then IE will be one, but IE could be, e.g., 0.75 even with an R0 still greater
than one after the intervention is active (as we will see below). IE depends
on both R0 and V0, as we will see.
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Figure 1: An SSe with large V0 and sporadic cases.
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Figure 2: An SSe with large V0 but lower R0, and sporadic cases.
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If the reader is dubious about this redefinition of efficacy, consider (a) the
disease introduced into 1000 cities. If, e.g., pe = 0.7 while pe,i = 0.9 (efficacy,
67 percent; these numbers are not implausible, see Table 1), the effect of the
intervention is to spare 200 cities on average from a local epidemic. More
convincing, perhaps, is to think about (b): the time before the epidemic takes
off in a given region, for the sporadically-appearing disease. In the scenario
in Table 1 fourth row, the epidemic takes off in a few months, but with the
intervention increasing pe to the value in the last row, it takes roughly a
half-year—perhaps enough time for epidemiologists or veterinarians to find
and eliminate the source of the virus.
I therefore explored efficacy for such interventions through simulating an
SSe epidemic with SSi’s of various efficiencies (at lowering Rh). See Figures
3 and 4. Efficacy is partially mediated by decreasing the effective (with-
intervention) R0, which in any case remains above one in the figures. Note
that, for a high-V0 epidemic, even an intervention with efficiency in the 60-70
percent range can be quite valuable.
I next asked whether it is easier or harder to stop an epidemic with a large
V0 (equivalently here, large Rh) than an epidemic with a smaller value, at
fixed intervention. The question is hard to answer through introspection or
analysis. On the one hand, a larger Rh should mean that the SSi intervention
is more relevant; on the other hand, the explosive nature of case growth
suggests the intervention would have to be larger. One thought suggests that
efficacy should be an increasing function of Rh, the other that it should be
decreasing. See Figures 5 and 6: in fact, efficacy in the models does diminish
with increasing Rh at fixed intervention efficiency, but falls off remarkably
slowly.
As of August 2013, MERS has not generated a pandemic after 10 months of
sporadic cases. The obvious explanation is that R0 is less than one—but that
could be an illusion; recall Figure 2! In July 2013, a group of epidemiologists
published in Lancet, [1] an estimate, based on 55 cases (there were more
as of July but the authors culled some due to ambiguities), of R0 as about
0.7, which I used for the lower figure (Rl) in the simulations. However, they
made an “Occam’s Razor” simplifying assumption which may have biased
their analysis. Despite being critical of the authors’ methodology, I agree
with their conclusion that R0 of MERS is currently less than one. (The best
fit in my model-class to the cluster-data reported in [1] had R0 = 0.813;
Rl = 0.402; Rh = 17.9; normal periods; and Sp-int = 3 days. I.e., an SSe but
not a pandemic. See appendix three.) Whatever the truth may be, in two
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Figure 3: Efficacy and effective R0 under the SS intervention (Markov case).
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Figure 4: Efficacy and effective R0 under the SS intervention (normal case).
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Figure 5: Efficacy vs. Rh, with fixed SS intervention (Markov case; by
formulas, see appendix 2).
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Figure 6: Efficacy vs. Rh, with fixed SS intervention (normal case; by simu-
lation).
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months time roughly two million persons are expected to visit Saudi Arabia
(the largest yearly gathering of people on the globe) for the annual religious
pilgrimage called the hajj. (1.7 million visited in 2012.) Saudi Arabia has a
population of 26 million, so this represents less than an eight percent increase;
however, these pilgrims will be congregating in a few sites where there may
be increased opportunity for viral transmission from infected cases, possibly
locally raising R0 and, more likely, V0. Also at present the source of the
sporadic cases is under investigation, with reports of a related virus in a bat
(not found in the Middle East, however), and antibodies to coronaviruses in
camels (but not in Saudi Arabia, and without recovery of a virus; because of
cross-reactivity the latter report may be noise). The situation is too uncertain
to make definite predictions about a MERS epidemic at this time.
Here is a summary of my conclusions about the SS epidemic and interven-
tions, based on the modeling exercise. First, it is better not to be complacent
about an often-fatal disease occurring at low frequency and generating small
clusters of secondary cases. Despite appearances, it may represent the “kin-
dling” phase of a future pandemic—which may develop even in the absence
of genetic modification in the pathogen increasing transmission rates to or
among humans (as occurred a decade ago in SARS; but an event, given
the current state of genetics, which nobody can predict). Second, the SSe
has very different dynamics from more uniform epidemics caused by, e.g., in-
fluenza or measles; remarkably, this permits the design of interventions which
are not available in the latter cases. For instance, because the superspreader
is rare and possibly detectable, a specifically targeted intervention may at
least delay the onset of a pandemic long enough to allow epidemiologists to
locate and eliminate the source of sporadic infections. Even detection af-
ter the end of a superspreader’s infectious period can be efficacious (through
contact-tracing). Finally, for my fellow math-modelers: the story related here
is an instance of the important role played by heterogeneity, and stochastic-
ity, in biology. (For other examples, see my books [5] and [6].) A desire for
simplicity in modeling is not an excuse for overlooking these possibilities.
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Appendix 1: the model
The model is of “agent-based” type, which means that the characteristics
of each case are stored separately in computer memory.5 The descriptors of
each case are: infectious status (in incubation period, so not infectious; or
infectious); infectious type; and some integers assigned at creation for identi-
fication purposes (including the index of the primary, if a secondary case; and
an indentifier for cluster). In addition, for each case some floating-point num-
bers are stored: when a case is created in the incubation phase, a predicted
(clock) time for entering the infectious phase; once in the latter, the time
of creation of a secondary case (updated when that event occurs); and the
time of death or end of infectious period. Because of the agent-based mod-
eling, these times can be generated with any desired distributions. For the
time-of-next-secondary-case, an exponential random variable is appropriate
(consistent with the assumption that the infections caused in a fixed period
have a Poisson distribution). But an exponential random variable is a poor
choice for the other waiting times (time-to-infectivity and to death or end-of-
infectious period), because the exponential law has no memory. Conventional
mathematical models assume that all waiting times are exponentials, because
the Markov Property then holds, permitting mathematicians to write down
and solve equations for quantities like extinction probabilities; see the math
appendix for discussion. However, the convenience of mathematicians should
not be a determining element in science. I assumed that the waiting times
other than for secondary infections had normal distributions (conditional on
being non-negative).
The simulation starts by filling in the characteristics and times for the
index case (and, for the sporadic scenario, a conjectured time for the appear-
ance of the next sporadic case). Then the smallest waiting time is found;
the corresponding changes are made, including creation of a new case and
its characteristics and waiting times if the event is a sporadic- or secondary-
infection. The clock time is moved forward to this event time. At subsequent
iterations the program runs through all the stored waiting times looking for
the next one; then performs those changes, etc. In other words, the process
is simulated in the most straightforward manner, with no mathematical ap-
proximations whatsoever except for the belief that the RNG provides truly
5The distinction is with “compartmental models,” in which all the cases with similar
characteristics are lumped into “compartments,” the terminology apparently derived from
“tissue compartments.” “Agent-based” is computer-science jargon.
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random digits (about which John von Neumann made his famous joke: “Any-
one who believes a computer can generate a random variable is living in sin”),
which is unlikely to cause trouble here. When computing extinction prob-
abilities, the process was run until either extinction occurred, 500 incident
(incubation or infectious) cases existed on a single day (after which I as-
sumed extinction was unlikely), or the clock time reached four years. 10,000
samples were used in simulations. Table 1 reports the comparisons of the
solvable (Markov) case with simulations of same; rerunning some cases with
100,000 repetitions, even the third decimal came out right.
Table A reports the parameters used. When more data about, e.g., MERS,
becomes available, it will be interesting to fit the model in order to estimate
parameters; a convenient method was introduced in my book [5], Chapter 5.
The program was written in the C programming language, runs on anything,
and is available from the author by request. (But if the reader is interested
in modeling the SSe, it is always better to write your own program then rely
on somebody else’s.)
Table A. parameters used in the simulation
parameter value
Rl 0.7
Rh 7.0–30.0
R0 1.2–2.0
incubation period 5.36 days1
infectious period 3.83 days 1
standard error of normal periods 0.2 x mean
Spinterval 3 or 6 days
1 Derived from modeling of SARS in Hong Kong, [4], but because of the com-
plexity of their model and fitting issues, these are questionable. See the dis-
cussion in my book [5], Chapter 6.
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Appendix 2: For mathematicians only
I am an ex-mathematical physicist. So why the resort to programming the
laptop? My motivation is simple: I intend to use the model to make pre-
dictions about MERS and other SS epidemics, once transmission parameters
become available. In my philosophy, the proper goal of any scientist is to
make predictions for future experiments or observations, because that is ul-
timately the only way to be sure that you are not modeling moonshine. So
Marc Kac’s fabled advice for mathematical physicists (“mutilate, mutilate
until you can solve the equations”) cannot be accepted. I may need to em-
ploy all sorts of peculiar distributions taken from empirical data. However,
it is useful to solve even an unrealistic scenario because it provides a formula
to compare to the output of the software for that case, helpful to allay the
suspicion that the results in this paper are due to bugs or numerical issues.
The Markov case is the model in which all waiting times—times to end of
the incubation period; to end of the infectious period; and to generate the
next secondary case—have exponential distributions. As pointed out in the
text, only for the last mentioned is this a realistic choice. But it is required
by the Markov property (“the future and the past are independent, given the
present”) because only the exponential is memoryless:
P [ τ > t+ s | τ > s ] = P [ τ > t ] , (4)
provided τ is an exponential random variable: P [ τ > t ] = exp(−λ t). With
the exponential for incubation and infectious periods, the number of sec-
ondary cases of a primary case is actually geometric rather than Poisson,
with a larger variance (so this case has EPV even even without multiple
types). It is, of course, the Markov property that makes it easy to derive
equations for probabilities associated to stochastic processes.
Here is a simple (non-rigorous?) derivation of the extinction probabilities
for the Markov version of the SS epidemic without sporadic cases. Let Ex
stand for the event: extinction of the infection-chain; Pk for probabilities
generated by the process begun by a type-k case; and rk for the corresponding
extinction probability, so:
rk = P [ extinction probability given one initial case, type k ]
= Pk [ Ex ] . (5)
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Then by conditioning on the first secondary case, if there is one:
rk = Pk [ Ex | no secondary cases ] × P [ no secondary cases ] + (6)∑
j
∫ ∞
0
Pk [ Ex | first secondary case is of type j, at time τ ](7)
× [temporal density of secondary case] pj × Pj [ Ex ] dτ (8)
=
ρ
ρ+ γk
+ (
γk
ρ+ γk
) rk
∑
j
pj rj. (9)
where γk is the rate of generating secondary cases by a primary case of type
k and ρ is the reciprocal of the time-to-end of the infectious period. Thus
we obtain a quadratic system, easily reduced to a single quadratic for the
two-level case of the text (below). However, the reader may doubt whether
this is rigorous.
There is another (long-winded but fully rigorous) approach for the Markov
case, which is to note that it is identical to a Markov birth-and-death compart-
mental jump process. Here we have to distinguish incubation and infectious
stages for each type; call the respective compartments (populations) Xk and
Yk. The rates of jumps for this process are:
jump rate interpretation
Xk −→ Xk + 1 pk ∑j γj Yj secondary infection;
Xk −→ Xk − 1 and
Yk −→ Yk + 1 η Xk progression;
Yk −→ Yk − 1 ρ Yk end infectious period.
Next given numbers 0 < rk < 1 and 0 < sk < 1 introduce the moment-
generating function (MGF):
φ = E
∏
r
Xk(t)
k s
Yk(t)
k ≡ E ξ, (10)
where E denotes expectation. Differentiating using Kolmogorov’s forward
equation (just a consequence of jumps occurring at given rates):
∂φ
∂t
=
∑
k
{ pk ( rk − 1 ) γj E Yjξ +
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η
(
sk
rk
− 1
)
EXk ξ +
ρ
(
1
sk
− 1
)
E Yk ξ.}. (11)
Now make the substitutions: rk ∂/∂rk −→ Xk and sk ∂/∂sk −→ Yk to
obtain the PDE:
∂φ
∂t
=
∑
k
 pk ( rk − 1 ) ∑
j
γj sj
∂φ
sj
+
η ( sk − rk ) ∂φ
rk
+
ρ ( 1− sk ) ∂φ
sk
}
. (12)
Solve this system by the method of characteristics; that is, define functions
of time rk(t) and sk(t) to satisfy the ODE system:
drk
dt
= η ( sk − rk ) ;
dsk
dt
= γk
∑
j
pj ( rj − 1 )
 sk + ρ ( 1− sk ) . (13)
Now note that φ is a function of r = {rk}, s = {sk} and t and from the
above
φ(r(t), s(t); 0) = φ(r(0), s(0); t). (14)
Also from its definition, if we take as initial conditions Xk = 1 and Yk = 0
lim
t→∞φ(t) = Pk [ Ex ] = rk, (15)
so setting the right-hand sides of the ODEs, (13), equal to zero to find the
fixed point gives the required extinction probabilities. The resulting equa-
tions are the same as (9).
For the two-level case, these equations are, using Rk = γk/ρ:
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(Rl ψ − 1) r1 + 1 = 0;
(Rh ψ − 1) r2 + 1 = 0;
ψ = pl r1 + ph r2 − 1, (16)
which after a little algebra yields the quadratic:
RhRl ψ
2 + (RlRh −Rl −Rh) ψ + 1−R0 = 0. (17)
This is solved for ψ (taking the negative sign in the quadratic formula and
rationalizing the numerator) by:
ψ =
4 ( 1−R0 ) RlRh
Rl +Rh −RlRh +
√
(Rl +Rh −RlRh )2 − 4 ( 1−R0 ) RlRh
(18)
Note that if the extinction probabilities r1 and r2 are less than one, ψ is
negative and vice versa; hence that is the case if and only if R0 > 1. Given
ψ, r1 and r2 can then be found from (16); pe = r1, r2, or p1 r1 + p2 r2,
depending on how you choose the initial condition. (The third is the realistic
case.) We used these results to reproduce tables and figures from the text,
comparing to output obtained by implementing exponentials for all waiting
times and repeating the simulations.
Why can’t we use the informal argument for the general case (without
requiring everything to be exponential)? Because there were several hidden
assumptions in deriving (9). For one, in (6) we used the exponential integral:
P [ no secondary cases ] = ρ
∫ ∞
0
du e−ρ u e−γk u, (19)
which in a non-exponential case would have to be done numerically. Worse,
in (8) there was a concealed use of the Markov property; I erased conditioning
as follows:
P [ Ex | first secondary case is of type j, at time τ ] =
P [ Ex | first secondary case is of type j ] ,
reasoning that the time of creation of the first secondary infection was not
informative about the time left in the infectious period, which invokes the
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memorylessness of the exponential law, or just the Markov property. In a
non-Markov case, that time would be informative, so one would have to
evaluate that conditional probability as stated somehow, and (9) becomes
a system of integral equations which would have to be solved on the com-
puter by discretizing the time, solving matrix equations, then letting the
discretization interval shrink, controlling for numerical error, etc. Relative
to simulating the process on a fast computer, it doesn’t seem worth the effort.
Appendix 3: The Lancet transmission paper,
[1]
The Lancet authors, Breban et al., based their analysis on certain case-
clusters (epidemiologically-linked cases), which they summarized in a table
(the scenarios concern how the authors interpreted the clusters in terms of
sporadic vs. secondary cases):
Table B. Distribution of cluster sizes
size scenario 1 scenario 2
1 17 11
2 4 2
3 3 3
4 1 1
5 0 2
24 1 1
Converting from numbers of clusters to frequencies:
Table C. Frequencies for cluster sizes
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size scenario 1 scenario 2
1 0.65 0.55
2 0.15 0.10
3 0.11 0.15
4 0.038 0.05
5 0 0.1
24 0.038 0.05
In their mathematical appendix, the Lancet authors begin by citing a pa-
per in PLoS by others [2] who showed how to use branching-processes and
Bayesian methodology to estimate R0 from cluster data, allowing for some
extra variance in reproductive number, namely by assuming a certain dis-
tribution (called the “negative binomial”) that interpolates between Poisson
and geometric. In my terminology, those two cases represent the uniform
epidemic with either fixed or exponential infectious period—so much smaller
EPV than allowed in my two-level model (which in fact has three free param-
eters, see last paragraph). The Lancet authors apply Bayesian analysis to
the PLoS authors’ distribution but reject it as unable to resolve both param-
eters (R0 and a dispersion parameter affecting V0) because the latter “could
be very large, even 1000.” It is here that they abused poor Occam6 and re-
treated to an analysis using Poisson and estimating a single parameter, R0.
Of course, with this assumption the big cluster in the last row must include
tertiary, etc., cases, because a cluster of 24 secondary cases of one primary
case, with an R0 of 0.7, is virtually impossible.
Here are simulated cluster frequencies under some models described in the
text (10,000 simulations, each run to 91 cases, per model; a “cluster” consists
of the tree generated by a sporadic primary case):
Table D. Simulated frequencies for cluster sizes
6Friar William of Occam did not say that “simplicity if best.” He actually said, in
the context of proving God’s existence, that “entities should not be multiplied without
necessity.”
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cluster size model A1 model B2 model C3 model D4 model E5
1 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.53 0.52
2 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16
3 0.07 0.069 0.09 0.09 0.082
4 0.041 0.041 0.055 0.053 0.048
5 0.028 0.028 0.036 0.035 0.03
6-23 0.11 0.098 0.123 0.112 0.091
24+ 0.013 0.0073 0.0084 0.004 0.066
1 R0 = Rl = Rh = 0.7; Markov; Sp-int = 6 days.
2 R0 = Rl = Rh = 0.7; Markov; Sp-int = 3 days.
3 R0 = Rl = Rh = 0.7; normal, st. error = 0.2 times mean; Sp-int = 6 days.
4 R0 = Rl = Rh = 0.7; normal, st. error = 0.2 times mean; Sp-int = 3 days.
5 R0 = 1.2, Rl = 0.7, Rh = 30.0; normal, st. error = 0.2 times mean; Sp-int
= 6 days.
Not surprisingly, the uniform (Poisson) model with R0 = 0.7 has difficulty
fitting the big cluster of 24 cases in the last line of Tables B/C; indeed, it
appears as if Models B-D can be rejected, say by a Fisherian p-value test.
This suggests that what happened in the Lancet authors’ Bayesian fitting
procedure is that their single-type, Poisson likelihood settled for fitting the
small clusters and ignored the the big one. Which could render their logic
circular (R0 is less than one because, in a model with no higher-infectious
types and ignoring one data point . . .R0 comes out less than one).
However, does that mean the authors’ conclusion is wrong? To answer
that question, I utilized the NkNN method (advertised in my book [5]) to
search for best-fitting models in my model-class. This venerable method se-
lects among various theories, given samples from each, that best explains a
given data-set; it is commonly used in pattern-recognition. (It reduces to
maximum likelihood in the limit of infinitely-large samples from each the-
ory; i.e., if you have an infinitely-fast computer to perform the simulations.)
Here the samples were 1,000 simulated epidemics, and corresponding cluster-
frequencies, from models chosen at random with 0.2 < Rl < 1, 1 < Rh < 30,
and Rl < R0 < min(Rh, 2.0), with 1,000 repetitions. The data-set was col-
umn one of Table C. The search turned up excellent fits for the frequency
data (smallest sum-of-squares, 0.052):
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Table E. Simulated frequencies for cluster sizes
cluster size model F1 model G2
1 0.67 0.680
2 0.16 0.17
3 0.062 0.066
4 0.027 0.031
5 0.013 0.016
6-23 0.030 0.022
24+ 0.032 0.013
1 R0 = 0.813; Rl = 0.402; Rh = 17.9; normal; Sp-int = 3 days.
2 R0 = 0.539; Rl = 0.392; Rh = 20.7; normal; Sp-int = 6 days.
On the basis of this result, I must agree that R0 < 1 for MERS at present.
Note however that the good fit of Table E to Table C is attained because
an SS model reproduces the big cluster in the last row of the latter. The
Lancet authors’ choice to limit their model-class to a Poisson distribution for
secondary cases ruled out this possibility—a SuperSpreader, multiple-levels,
epidemic model, but with R0 less than one—a priori. On the other hand,
“fitting” a three-parameter model to data consisting of seven frequencies
cannot be recommended either.
Now a bit of preaching about modeling traps. When you have a model
with free parameters and a data-set, there are two ways to delude yourself.
Methods like Bayesian analysis, possible if you have an explicit likelihood,
or my NkNN method, which works for anything provided you can simulate
fast enough, will generate a “best-fitting model.” If some parameter (like
the PLoS authors’ dispersion parameter) fluctuates so much that it can’t be
pinned down, you can choose to omit it—i.e., mutilate the model in order
to be able to “estimate the parameters.” Or you can keep the troublesome
parameter and let the software choose a “best model.” Either way, the
model selected may be false; but you won’t discover that until more data
arrives. In my book, [5], I labeled these two pitfalls the “Simple-is-Best
Trap” and the “Etch-a-Sketch Trap” and argued that the modeler is required
Stopping the SS epidemic 28
to steer between these two hazards, like Odysseus sailing between Skylla and
Charybdis. Fall in the first, and your parameter estimates will be wrong or
biologically unintelligible; fall in the other, and your model can “explain”
anything (which Karl Popper decried as not science). Ultimately, the best
approach is to make a prediction—even when it fails, you will have learned
something. (Unfortunately, on the basis of the data thus far available, making
a prediction about MERS is impossible.)
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